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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David S. Begley appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The relevant facts and course of proceedings of the underlying case were 
outlined by the district court in its order denying motion for summary disposition 
and notice of intent to dismiss: 
On June 5, 2008, a Grand Jury indicted Begley on three 
counts of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under 16 Years of Age in 
Case Number CR-2008-16840-C. On March 27, 2009, a Status 
Conference was held and a plea agreement was reached between 
the State, Begley, and his then attorney Richard L. Harris 
(hereinafter, Harris). The State agreed to dismiss all charges in 
CR-2008-16840-C, and thereafter, on March 27, 2009 the State 
filed a new case, CR-2009-10663-C, against Begley charging him 
with one count of Felony Injury to a Child, in violation of I.C. § 
18.1501(1). 
On March 27, 2009, Begley and Harris completed a Guilty 
Plea Advisory form, which included information regarding Begley's 
right to be represented by an attorney and that upon request this 
Court would appoint an attorney to be paid by the county. Begley 
entered an Alford Plea with this Court. Begley stated he was fully 
advised of the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, Begley 
was notified of the maximum and minimum sentence associated 
with this crime. And finally, this Court informed Begley that it was 
not bound by any sentencing recommendations offered to the 
Court. 
On March 27, 2009, this Court ordered a Presentence 
Investigation Report, which included a polygraph report, character 
reference letters, and a Psychosexual Evaluation. 
On June 3, 2009, Begley's counsel filed a Sentencing 
Memorandum. 
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On June 9, 2009, this Court held a sentencing hearing at 
which time one alleged victim and several character witnesses on 
behalf of Begley provided testimony. This Court had reviewed the 
Presentence Investigation Report. This Court found Begley guilty 
of the offense of Felony Injury to Child, I.C. § 18.1501 (1 ), and 
sentenced Begley within the law to ten years in the state 
penitentiary, one year fixed, nine years indeterminate. 
On June 15, 2009, this Court entered a Judgment and 
Commitment that Begley had been convicted upon his plea of guilty 
to the offense of Injury to Child. 
On June 24, 2009, Begley filed a Motion to Correct or 
Reduce Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35, ICR. 
On June 26, 2009, the State filed its objection to Rule 35 
Motion and Request for Hearing. 
On July 10, 2009, Begley filed a notice of Appeal. 
On October 1, 2009, this Court denied Begley's Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence. 
On March 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals of the State of 
Idaho upheld this Court's judgment and sentence and the order 
denying Begley's Rule 35 motion. 
(R., pp.80-81 (citations to transcript of change of plea hearing omitted).) 
Begley then filed a timely pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction 
relief and a motion and affidavit for the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.2-25.) 
The district court appointed counsel to assist Begley in his post-conviction relief 
case. (R., pp.29-31.) The state filed an answer to Begley's initial petition for 
post-conviction relief requesting Begley's claim be denied and/or dismissed. (R., 
pp.26-28). Through counsel, Begley filed an amended petition and affidavit in 
support of post-conviction relief asserting his "guilty plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made because the court failed to determine a factual basis for his 
Alford plea after [Begley] continued to maintain his innocence" as well as a claim 
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of ineffective assistance of counsel with nine separate bases. (R., pp.36-48.) 
The state filed an answer to the amended petition. (R., pp.49-51.) Begley then 
filed a motion for summary disposition and supporting brief addressing only the 
voluntary nature of his guilty plea. (R., pp.52-53, 60-76.) 
The district court issued an order denying Begley's motion for summary 
disposition and providing notice of its intent to dismiss. (R., pp.79-86.) Begley 
responded to the notice of intent to dismiss, again only addressing the voluntary 
nature of his guilty plea. (R., pp.87-90.) The district court thereafter filed an 
order of dismissal on the grounds set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., 
pp.92-94.) 
Begley timely appealed. (R., pp.95-99.) 
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ISSUES 
Begley states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. 
Begley's claim that his Alford plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made because the record of his plea 
hearing, at which he maintained his innocence, did not contain a 
strong factual basis for the charge to which he pied guilty? 
2. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed another 
claim raised in Mr. Begley's amended petition for post-conviction 
relief without providing notice of the reasons for dismissal? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as follows: 
1. Has Begley failed to show error in the district court's summary 
dismissal of his claim that his Alford plea was not knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily made? 
2. Has Begley failed to establish that he lacked notice of the grounds for 
summary dismissal of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to move to strike information from victims of uncharged crimes from 




Begley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief On The Ground That His 
Alford Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently And Voluntarily Entered 
A Introduction 
Begley asserts the "district court erred when it summarily dismissed a 
claim that his Alford plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made 
because the record of his plea hearing, at which he maintained his innocence, 
did not contain a strong factual basis for the charge to which he pied guilty." 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) Because the record supports the district court's 
conclusion that Begley's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made in addition to 
supporting a finding of a strong factual basis for the entry of such a plea, 
Begley's argument fails. 
8. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 
550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint 
in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain 
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). The petitioner must submit 
verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to 
support his allegations. kl (citing I.C. § 19-4903). Furthermore, the factual 
showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence 
that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 
612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
6 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. kl (citing Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl 
D. Begley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination 
That Begley Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling 
Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On The Issue Of The Voluntariness Of His 
Plea 
"Before a trial court accepts a plea of guilty in a felony case, the record 
must show that the plea has been made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, 
and the validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant 
circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record." State v. 
Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 833, 839 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 297-98, 787 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1990) (citation 
omitted). Begley asserts his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entered because he maintained his innocence and the record of the entry of his 
plea "did not contain a strong factual basis for the charge to which he pleaded 
guilty." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Review of the record, which establishes that 
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Begley entered the plea to avoid a possible conviction on greater charges, shows 
this claim to be without merit 
When an Alford plea is entered, 
an accused may voluntarily consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence despite a professed belief in his or her innocence, as long 
as a factual basis for the plea is demonstrated by the state, and the 
accused clearly expresses a desire to enter such a plea. In Idaho, 
there is no general obligation to inquire into the factual basis of a 
guilty plea. However, such an inquiry should be made if an Alford 
plea is accepted, or if the court receives information before 
sentencing which raises an obvious doubt as to guilt. 
Ramirez, 122 Idaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248 (quoting Anderson v. State, 119 
Idaho 994,996,812 P.2d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 1991). A factual basis need not be 
proven by reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to determine a strong factual 
basis exists to ensure the voluntariness of the plea: 
By determining that a strong factual basis for the plea exists, the 
trial court ensures that the defendant is pleading guilty because he 
believes that the state could, and more likely than not would, prove 
the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt; and thus the 
defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily because 
he believes it to be in his best interests to do so, despite his 
continued assertion of innocence. 
Ramirez, 122 Idaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. Desire to take advantage of a 
plea agreement is an appropriate basis for entry of an Alford plea. See North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471, 474, 
976 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 927, 
854 P.2d 765, 770 (Ct. App. 1993); Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 626-27, 826 
P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Ct. App. 1992). When determining if the requisite factual 
basis for the plea exists, an appellate court looks "to the entire record before the 
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trial judge at the time the plea was accepted." & (citing Fowler v. State, 109 
Idaho 1002, 1005, 712 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1985).) 
Begley was originally charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a 
child. (R., p.80.) As his attorney advised the district court at the change of plea 
hearing that there had been lengthy plea negotiations to arrive at a plea to a new 
charge of injury to child: 
Judge, and perhaps I can explain the full ramifications of what has 
gone on here. 
The court is aware that Mr. Begley took a polygraph test 
back in February and he passed the polygraph with reference to the 
other charge. Since then I've had considerable amount of 
communication with [the assigned prosecutor]. I've had 
conferences with [the elected prosecutor]. I've talked to another 
prosecutor about this matter on at least a couple of occasions, 
different prosecutors, and where we're at this afternoon is a 
compromise by both the state and Mr. Begley. 
The compromise is a dismissal of the L and L charge in 
return for filing this charge and obtaining Mr. Begley's plea to this 
charge of injury to a child. 
The compromise on our part is to accept the filing of this 
Information and entering a plea to this information. And we are 
receiving a benefit by doing that of not having to go to trial on the L 
and L charge with the risk - and we discussed that at length. We 
have gone back and forth on this with Mr. Begley and Mrs. Begley 
with reference to entering a plea to this charge this afternoon. 
And what we were really doing here is a number of things: 
One is we are ending this matter with a plea. Number two we are 
receiving a benefit by not having to go to a jury trial on the L and L 
and risk conviction and subsequently having to register as a sex 
offender and the stigmatization that goes along with that in the 
event that the jury returned a verdict of guilty. And then obviously 
there's - we eliminate the cost of trial and the accruing costs of 
further legal proceedings in the matter as we proceed. 
So with a compromise on the part of the state and a 
compromise that we're making, it is our desire this afternoon to 
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enter an Alford plea to this charge and take advantage of what the 
state has done and eliminate the risk of a potential jury verdict that 
may be adverse and that we avoid that. 
(3/27/2009 Tr. 1, p.4, L.16 - p.6, L.4.) Upon inquiry from the court, the state 
provided additional background regarding Begley's charge in terms of what 
would happen if Begley were in sex offender treatment for the offense he was 
about to enter an Alford plea to: 
Judge, I think what's going to happen with Mr. Begley is that 
there is going to be a victim's polygraph, but it's not going to be 
limited just to these three victims. [Defense counsel] has brought 
up quite a bit the polygraph that took place with regard to the 
charged victims. There was another polygraph with one of the 
uncharged victims which the court ruled could not testify pursuant 
to 404 (b) that Mr. Begley actually failed. So that's a huge factor as 
to why the state is asking and pushing so hard for him to attend sex 
offender treatment as I believe that he would benefit from it, 
especially given the fact that there are prior uncharged victims. 
That's a huge part of it. And I think that's what SANE Solutions is 
going to address. He's going to be facing victim's polygraphs to 
make sure there aren't additional victims and make sure that we 
have covered and the treatment covers all the possible victims out 
there. 
(3/27/2009 Tr. p.18, L.24 - p.19, L.16.) 
The district court had the benefit of having presided over motion hearings 
in the original lewd conduct case in addition to having the information as provided 
by the prosecutor about the existence of additional victims and victims' polygraph 
examinations as well as Begley's failed polygraph examination in addressing a 
victim not charged in the original lewd conduct case. All of these factors played a 
part in the amendment of the charges. That background information gave the 
1 This transcript of the change of plea hearing was made part of the record on 
appeal with the October 4, 2012 order granting motion to augment the record 
with "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition, with 
attachments, file-stamped August 5, 2011." 
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district court a strong factual basis for the entry of a guilty plea to injury to child 
and led into the following colloquy: 
THE COURT: The Information that's been filed in this case 
charges the following offense: That the defendant David Begley on 
or between the first day of January 2007, through May 27, 2007, in 
the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did under circumstances 
likely to produce great bodily harm or death to a child under 18 
years of age, specifically T.C., date of birth nd/or 
A.H., date of birth  unlawfully and willfully caused or 
permit the person or health of the child to be injured while having 
care or custody of said child. 
Now, to that offense do you plead guilty? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, we will enter an Alford plea to 
that charge. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Begley, do you plead guilty to this 
offense on the basis that you feel like the state has sufficient 
evidence that there's a likelihood they could prove their case at 
trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don't think they can prove it, 
but-
THE COURT: Well, here's the situation. My understanding of 
the case of Alford versus North Carolina, which is a case decided 
by the United States Supreme Court, it essentially stands for the 
proposition that a person can plead guilty to a crime even though 
they don't believe they're guilty but on the basis that they 
understand that the state's evidence is strong enough that they 
very well may lose the case at a jury trial. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So I guess what I'm asking you is - I mean, 
you've talked to your attorney. And what I heard your attorney say 
earlier today is that the risk of losing on three charges of lewd and 
lascivious conduct against children is something that you've 
weighed in your consideration. Is that fair to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: So is that why you're then pleading guilty to 
this new charge of injury to children? 
THE DEFENDANT: If you're asking the reason why I'm pleading is 
because of the cost of the jury trial, one. Financially we can't afford 
it. Two, it's a flip of a coin, their word versus mine. My attorney 
has advised me of that, that it can go either way. And so I do 
understand, but that is the reason why I've chosen to follow this 
path is just financially and I want it to be over with and done. I 
mean, it's been drug out for a very long time. 
THE COURT: Okay. But when you use the phrase it's just a 
flip of a coin as to what could happen, what I'm hearing you say is 
that you agree that the jury very well could believe these children 
that get up and testify. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And if they did, the likelihood is that you would 
be found guilty by the jury. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And so is that really - that risk, is that why 
you're pleading guilty to this offense? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
(3/27/09 Tr., p.21, L.1 - p.23, L.12.) 
The record supports the conclusion that the trial judge made sufficient 
inquiry to determine there was a factual basis for the charge of injury to child as it 
replaced the original charges of lewd conduct with a child and that Begley 
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. The record supports the district 
court's conclusion that "after reviewing all the records in this case, this Court 
finds that Begley entered his Alford Plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 
(R., p.84.) Begley has thus failed to show the court erred in concluding there 
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was no genuine issue of material fact and dismissing Begley's claim that he plea 
was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. 
II. 
Begley Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal 
Without Requisite Notice In The Court's Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Of His 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim For Failing To Strike The Information 
Regarding Uncharged Victims From Begley's Presentence Investigation Report 
A. Introduction 
Begley asserts on appeal that "the district court erred when, without 
providing notice of the reasons for dismissal, it summarily dismissed his claim 
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to, and move to strike from 
the pre-sentence investigation report, information concerning three other minors 
who had made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.13-14.) Because the underlying purpose of the notice requirement was 
upheld in this matter, any error was harmless and Begley's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
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exists. Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P .2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. A Review Of The Record Shows That Any Lack Of Notice For The 
Specific Basis Upon Which The Court Dismissed Begley's Claim That His 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Strike The Information Of Three 
Uncharged Victims From Begley's Presentence Investigation Report Was 
At Worst Harmless Error 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief upon motion by a party or on the court's own 
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App. 
1995). "When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State, 
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted). When the state 
files a motion for summary dismissal, setting forth adequate notice of the grounds 
for dismissal, and the court grants the state's motion for the reasons urged by the 
state, a post-conviction petitioner receives adequate notice of the grounds for 
dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 
1986). The district court cannot, however, "dismiss a claim on a ground not 
asserted by the state in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice 
required by Section 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 
P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 
P.2d 795, 798 (1995)). The purpose of the 20-day notice requirement of I.C. § 
19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal 
authority or evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. 
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State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 
102 Idaho 487,489, 632 P.2d 676,678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 
818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In his amended petition for post-conviction relief, Begley claimed his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to represent his interests in the following ways: 
a) Failure to advise me that a psycho-sexual evaluation would 
be part of the presentence investigation process. 
b) Failure to advise me of my rights not to participate in a 
psycho-sexual evaluation and my right to consult with an attorney 
prior to the evaluation process. 
c) Failure to discuss with me, and prepare me for, the psycho-
sexual evaluation process. 
d) Prior to changing my plea, counsel failed to advise me what 
was meant by a minimum of one (1) year sentence in this case. 
e) Counsel wrongfully advised me to change my plea from not 
guilty to guilty. 
f) Counsel failed to secure for me a plea agreement that was 
binding not only upon the State but the Court as well. 
g) Counsel failed to request a change of venue due to the 
tremendous amount of pretrial publicity about my case. 
h) Counsel failed to call as witnesses during my sentencing 
hearing Chip Morgan, polygrapher, and Dr. Johnson, the psycho-
sexual evaluator, to present testimony in mitigation. 
i) Counsel failed to object to, and move to strike from the 
presentence investigation report, information about three (3) other 
minors who had made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse 
byme. 
(R., pp.37-38.) Begley filed a motion for summary disposition that addressed 
only the voluntary nature of his plea, failing to address any of the remaining 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.52-53, 60-76.) 
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The district court filed an order denying Begley's motion for summary 
dismissal and providing notice of its intent to dismiss Begley's petition for post-
conviction relief. The court noted Begley alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the following grounds: 
Begley was alleged he was told by [defense counsel] he would be 
placed on probation and that the judge would grant him a withheld 
judgment; Begley alleged that [defense counsel] did not inform him 
that the Court would order a psycho-sexual evaluation which would 
be used during his sentencing hearing; Begley alleged that 
[defense counsel] did not attempt to seek a change of venue from 
the Court because of media coverage; and Begley alleged that 
[defense] counsel failed to adequately represent him by failing to 
present Chip Morgan who conducted the polygraph test and Dr. 
Johnson who performed the psycho-sexual evaluation at his 
sentencing hearing. 
(R., p.84.) The court articulated the two prongs of the Strickland2 test and 
concluded, "Begley made these claims without any support, and did not brief the 
issue. The court finds nothing in the record to find counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." (R., p.84.) 
Begley filed a response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss again only 
addressing the issue of the voluntariness of his guilty plea and failing to provide 
any additional information in support of any of his claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. (See R., pp.87-91.) The court thereafter dismissed Begley's petition 
for post-conviction relief on the grounds set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. 
(R., pp.92-94.) 
The court's recitation of Begley's ineffective counsel claims omitted the 
final allegation in Begley's amended petition for post-conviction relief, namely the 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
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allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to strike the information of the 
three uncharged victims from the presentence investigation report. However, 
Begley's appellate claim he did not understand his last allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was subject to dismissal is without merit Read as a 
whole, the district court gave notice that the entire claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, not just part of it, was subject to summary dismissal for failure to 
support it with evidence. 
Even if there was error, any error of notice is harmless because Begley 
had an opportunity to respond to the court's determination that his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel were unsupported and Begley failed to avail 
himself of the opportunity. "The notice procedure is necessary so that the 
applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue 
of fact if one exists." (Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). Although Begley filed a response to the court's 
notice of intent to dismiss, he failed to address the claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel at all. Asserting at this stage that he was deprived of sufficient notice 
that the court was dismissing all of the claim for a failure to support his claims of 
ineffectiveness of counsel with admissible evidence is disingenuous where 
Begley had the opportunity to provide additional evidence but completely failed to 
address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in favor of only supporting 
his argument pertaining to the voluntariness of his guilty plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Begley's petition for post-conviction relief. 
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